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Abstract A common approach to dealing with software requirements volatility is to define
product families instead of single products. In earlier papers we have developed an algebra of
such families that, roughly, consists in a more abstract view of and-or trees of features as used
in Feature-Oriented Domain Analysis. A product family is represented by an algebraic term
over the feature names; it can be manipulated using equational laws such as associativity or
distributivity.
Initially, only “syntactic” models of the algebra were considered, giving more or less just
the names of the features used in the various products of a family and certain interrelations
such as mandatory occurrence and implication between or mutual exclusion of features,
without attaching any kind of “meaning” to the features. While this is interesting and useful
for determining the variety and number of possible members of such a family, it is wholly
insufficient when it comes to talking about the correctness of families in a semantic manner.
In the present paper we define a class of “semantic” models of the general abstract prod-
uct family algebra that allows treating very relevant additional questions. In these models,
the features of a family are requirements scenarios formalised as pairs of relational specifi-
cations of a proposed system and its environment.
However, the paper is just intended as a proof of feasibility; we are convinced that the
approach can also be employed for different semantic models such as general denotational
or stream-based semantics.
Key words: Formal model driven software development, software family, product family
algebra, functional requirements, requirements scenarios, semantics
1 Introduction
Software developers are pressed to produce, in a relatively short period of time, many
variations of a software product that exhibit high system qualities (such as relia-
bility, availability, and maintainability). Moreover, they need to handle volatility in
the requirements of these variations, while they have to struggle to be ahead of the
competition in an ever changing market. Two main techniques for dealing with these
challenges have been proposed. The first deals with the focus of attention in software
development processes while the second relates to the methods employed along the
development process.
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• The first technique proposes that, instead of focusing our attention onto a sin-
gle software system to be built, one takes predictable changes into account. This
amounts to the analysis and design of a family of software systems, called a soft-
ware product line, that share a core part (commonality among all the members).
Software product line engineering, which is a family-oriented software production
process and method, seems to be adopted by both practitioners and researchers
to deal with changes in the requirements and thereby revisions of the correspond-
ing designs. The idea behind product line engineering is to take advantage of the
commonality of systems that are developed for a specific domain.
Faulk [Fau01] points out that much of the research related to product line pro-
cesses and techniques has focused on the development stages that go from the
architectural design to the coding and has dealt essentially with enhancing the
reuse of software artefacts or paradigms related to these stages. However, one
should expect that family-based software development should start at the earli-
est stage of the adopted software development process. A software development
system tailored for a non-monolithic software development process should take
into account the modern reality of software production: expected and unexpected
changes in the requirements (both functional and non-functional) are unavoidable
and must consequently be reflected and accommodated in software development
processes and techniques. Only a few studies have combined the software family
approach with requirements analysis [MYC05].
The limitation of the family-based approach to software development is captured
in one of its underlying assumptions, namely the oracle hypothesis from [WL99,
page 11]: “It is possible to predict the changes that are likely to be needed to a
system over its lifetime”. The rapid change in the user needs and in market trends
makes it hard to consider this hypothesis as tenable. Hence, another technique is
required to deal with unpredictable changes.
In [Bro06b], Broy highlights the main challenges that the automotive software in-
dustry faces. He points to the importance of dependences between different func-
tions of a car. In particular, he shows several kinds of feature interactions. He also
stresses that one of the biggest problems in automotive industry is the lack of
more appropriate requirements engineering and that modelling and understand-
ing the requirements lie in the centre of software challenges. We believe that these
problems are not limited to automotive software. They are challenges in nearly all
software industries such as mobile phone industry or banking.
• The second technique proposed in the literature for dealing with, among others,
changes and the volatility of some aspects of the users requirements is Model
Driven Engineering (MDE), which is a general approach to the automation of
model processing. By the above discussion, this technique has to work in absence
of the oracle assumption. The MDE approach consists in systematic transition from
a set of initial models, that constitute the starting points for the MDE process of
a software system, to its executable code. However, the current techniques for
this transition approach lack formality. To allow trust in the obtained code, the
transformations need to be based on a well-defined syntax and semantics grounded
in established mathematical theories (e.g., languages, set theory, algebras, etc.).
Be´zivim et al. [BBJ07] indicate that since 2001 model driven software develop-
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ment has taken different forms. However, they all share the same principle: for
each domain of application a meta-model (or abstract model) is constructed, to
which then all models used within that domain (the so-called derived models)
must “conform” [BBJ07]. The initial family models are the result of requirements
engineering processes. In other terms, they are the result of elicitation and for-
malisation activities. These activities need to be performed in a systematic and
rigorous manner, but not necessary formally. Once one reaches formal models,
formal transformations should be adopted when ever possible. One can envisage
transformations of abstract models to more detailed ones or to views of potential
functional architectures of the system. An architecture of a system is commonly or-
ganized in views, which are comparable to the different types of blueprints made in
building architecture. Common views in software architecture are functional/logic
views, module views, development views, data views, concurrency views, or user
feedback views. From the abstract models one can generate some of these views
that reflect the functional aspects of the system. The derived models give the
specifications of both the system and the environment in which it is supposed to
operate. Thus, it helps in presenting exactly what the system is expected to do in
reaction to stimuli from its environment.
Despite several decades of research on developing techniques and methodologies
for specifying and verifying software-intensive systems, we are still faced with many
challenges in this area. In [Bro06a], Broy writes: ”Developing a methodology for spec-
ifying and verifying software-intensive systems poses a grand challenge that a broad
stream of research must address”.
The results presented in this paper set up a mathematical framework to combine
the software family approach with model driven software development. The aim is
to tackle building and maintaining systems that consist of many parts or are per-
forming diverse functionalities that are continuously changing and constantly being
maintained.
We present a transformation of a software family requirements model into de-
tailed requirements models of its members. This transformation is based on product
family algebra and relation algebra. We give the mathematical foundation for this
transformation system.
In earlier papers [HKM06a, HKM09] we have developed an algebra of product
families that, roughly, consists in a more abstract view of and-or trees of features as
used in Feature-Oriented Domain Analysis (FODA). A product family is represented
by an algebraic term over the feature names; it can be manipulated using equational
laws such as associativity or distributivity.
Initially, only “syntactic” models of the algebra were considered, giving more or
less just the names of the features used in the various products of a family and certain
interrelations such as mandatory occurrence and implication between or mutual ex-
clusion of features, without attaching any kind of “meaning” to the features in form
of descriptions, specifications, or models. While this is interesting and useful for de-
termining the variety and number of possible members of such a family, it is wholly
insufficient when it comes to talking about the correctness of families in a semantic
sense.
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In the models of the present paper, the features of a family are requirement
scenarios formalised as pairs of relational specifications of a proposed system and its
environment.
However, the paper is just intended as a proof of feasibility; we are convinced
that the approach can also be employed for different semantic models such as general
denotational or stream-based semantics.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 the underlying concepts and
theory are recapitulated. In particular, we give the definition of product family algebra
as well as a small example. This example illustrates also what is meant by a system’s
behaviour and its environment. After that, we formalise a command language for
scenarios in Section 3. Its semantics is based on a transition relation that describes
the connection from starting states to their possible successor states. Based on that
we derive a product family algebra for formal scenarios in Section 4. In Section 5 the
theory is underpinned by an illustrative example. Moreover, further applications of
our approach are briefly mentioned. The paper concludes with a discussion concerning
related work (Section 6) and future work (Section 7).
2 Background
2.1 A Brief Review of Program Family Algebra
To specify a software family, we use the language of a product family algebra which
is an idempotent and commutative semiring.
Definition 2.1. (e.g. [HW98])
1. A semiring is a quintuple (S,+, 0, ·, 1) such that (S,+, 0) is a commutative monoid
and (S, ·, 1) is a monoid such that · distributes over + and 0 is an annihilator, i.e.,
0 · a = 0 = a · 0.
2. A semiring is idempotent if + is idempotent, i.e., a + a = a for all a ∈ S, and
commutative if · is commutative.
3. In an idempotent semiring the relation a ≤ b ⇔df a+ b = b is a partial order, i.e.,
a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation, called the natural order on S. It
has 0 as its least element. Moreover, + and · are isotone with respect to ≤.
In the context of product family specification, + can be interpreted as a choice
between options of products and · as their composition or mandatory presence. This
motivates the following definition.
Definition 2.2. An idempotent commutative semiring is called a product family al-
gebra [HKM09]. Its elements are termed product families and can be considered as
abstractly representing sets of products each of which is composed via · from a number
of features. The constant 0 represents the empty family of products, while the con-
stant 1 represents the singleton family consisting only of the empty product without
any features. Hence a term 1 + a represents optionality of the family a.
Example 2.3. We describe a family of simple banking services: a bank has several
software products that differ by the options they provide to a customer for opening a
new account directly at a branch, via a web page or by e-mail. The latter two activities
add some functionality to the basic opening activity at a branch. Moreover, there are
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some further standard activities involved in account opening that are subsumed by
restOfCoreBnkgSystem. We may then specify our family of services by the following
algebraic expression:
BankingFamily = openAccAtBranch
· (1 + openAccountOnline + openAccountByMail)
· restOfCoreBnkgSystem .
By commutativity of the · operator this term is equal to
BankingFamily = openAccAtBranch · restOfCoreBnkgSystem
· (1 + openAccountOnline + openAccountByMail) .
Hence the commonality of the family is described by the subterm
openAccAtBranch · restOfCoreBnkgSystem
while its variability is given by
1 + openAccountOnline + openAccountByMail
which adds to the commonality either nothing (summand 1) or openAccountOnline
or openAccountByMail. The variability states that either openAccountOnline or
openAccountByMail is possible, but not both. If one wants not only both features
in conjunction (openAccountOnline · openAccountByMail) but also optionality of
each, the expression has to be rewritten into
1 + openAccountOnline + openAccountByMail
+ openAccountOnline · openAccountByMail
By distributivity this equals
(1 + openAccountOnline) · (1 + openAccountByMail) .
uunionsq
These algebraic expressions are closely related to FODA-like and-or trees (see
[HKM09]). More precisely, they relate to feature diagrams of Feature-Oriented Do-
main Analysis (FODA) [KCH+90]. These diagrams capture the commonalities and
mandatory features as well as the optional ones of a feature algebra. The leaf nodes
contain the basic features of the described product family. In the domain dictionary
each basic feature is specified.
We exemplify this correspondence for our example. We assume that there are
constants, such as openAccountOnline or openAccountByMail for every basic feature.
Example 2.4. Figure 1 shows a possible feature diagram for the product family
BankingFamily introduced in Example 2.3. We can only give possible diagrams since
feature diagrams are not unique and there are several and-or trees corresponding to
one single algebraic expression. uunionsq
The translation rules for the basic parts of an arbitrary and-or tree into an
algebraic term are given in Table 1.
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BankingFamily
optFunctopenAccAtBranch restOfCoreBnkgSystem
openAccountOnline openAccountByMail
Fig. 1. Feature diagram for BankingFamily
Base construct Description Algebraic counterpart
(feature diagram)
A , A
mandatory and
optional feature
A and (1 + A), resp.
A B , A B
etc. multiple features A ·B, A · (1 + B), etc.
A B
alternative features A + B
A B
or-group A + B + A ·B
Table 1. FODA feature diagrams and their corresponding algebraic terms
Using these rules every feature diagram can be transformed into an algebraic expres-
sion using a bottom-up traversal. This recursive method translates each subtree into
an algebraic expression, starting from the leaf nodes going up to the root. When the
basic constants are not interpreted, the result is unique up to commutativity and
associativity of the semiring operators.
In sum, these grammar-like expressions could be read purely syntactically as
stating what basic features are involved in the services and how the overall services
are composed from them. Still, the expressions can be transformed using laws of
product family algebra, like associativity, commutativity or distributivity. However,
it is much more important to attach meaning to the feature identifiers so that certain
properties of the specified service family can be proved. This is what we will do in
the next section.
2.2 A Command Model of Requirements Specifications
As our sample for a semantic model of product family algebra we use the idea of formal
scenarios as defined in [DFK+98]. In that approach, an informal scenario is first
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translated into an imperative notation (for which we will give a relational semantics
in the next section). The result is split into two parts: one describes the expected
behaviour of the system according to the scenario and the other the behaviour of its
environment. Hence, a formal scenario is a pair (Cs, Ce) of commands that describe
the possible actions of environment and system, respectively. The operation of the
whole system then essentially consists in a finite or infinite repetition of the non-
deterministic choice between Cs and Ce.
Example 2.5. Let us exemplify this again with our banking service family. Here is
an informal specification of the program unit openAccAtBranch.
The customer shows up at a branch of the bank and requests to open an account.
The bank, through its representative at the branch, analyses the conditions for opening
an account. If the customer is eligible for that, the bank representative asks for one of
her identification documents. The representative enters into the system the customer’s
identification number and the type of identification document used. If the customer
is an existing customer, the system displays the remaining information needed and
proposes personalised account privileges. Otherwise, the system displays that the
customer is a new customer, asks for her full name and address, and assigns to the
account the standard banking privileges. If the customer accepts the privileges and
pays the standard account opening fees, then the system issues a card that allows the
customer to access her newly created account.
As shown in [DFK+98, DKM05], the above informal scenario gives a partial de-
scription of the behaviour of the system as well as of its environment. We adopt
the approach that these two behaviours are described by two separate relations
openAccAtBranchs and openAccAtBranche, respectively, and that the set of states
from which the environment is able to make an action is disjoint with that from
which the system is able to make an action. Since a scenario is supposed to describe
the environment-system interactions, it should contain only a description of the ac-
tions that originate in the domain of the function of the environment (resp. system)
and terminate in a state in the domain of the function of the system (resp. envi-
ronment). Therefore, the above condition indicates that, according to a scenario, at
each state of the space exclusively either the environment or the system can make an
action, which puts a clear separation between the system and its environment.
Scenarios might not prescribe an action at each observable state of the system’s
state space. In this case we say that the scenario is not space complete. When a
requirements scenario is not space complete, the scenario is silent on what needs to
be performed at some states of its space. Scenarios are inherently partial descriptions
and therefore it is rare that they are space complete. uunionsq
The command openAccAtBranch describes the behaviour of both the system and
its environment, perceived as forming together a closed system. Hence, at each state
a choice is made between commands from openAccAtBranchs or openAccAtBranche.
As the notation for the concrete description of such relations we use a slight
variation of Dijkstra’s guarded command [Dij76] (see Lemma 3.7 for the relation with
the original version) in the form
B1 −→ C1 dc · · · dcBn −→ Cn
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where the Bi are predicates specifying the preconditions for execution of the com-
mands Ci and dc denotes non-deterministic choice. The semantics is that an arbitrary
Ci for which Bi is true is executed. If none of the Bi is true, the execution of the
command fails.
Example 2.6. We present a part of the specifications of openAccAtBranchs and
openAccAtBranche; their full specifications as well as that of the whole scenario can
be found in Appendix A. In the code, fld stands for “field”. The system and the
environment operate on a common set of variables, such as cstmerEligOpnAcc, idNum,
newCstmer or crdIssued. Together they form the global state, which can be queried
by predicates such as cstmerEligOpnAcc or newCstmer.
Two clauses of the behaviour of the banking system as given by the above scenario
are the following:
openAccAtBranchs
=df “
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ ¬acctCreated ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldCsrmerName := getCstmerName(idNum) ;
fldCstmerAddress := getCstmerAddress(idNum)
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
−→ acctprivileges := personalized ;
outputMssge := msgeAccptPrvlges?
”
dc . . .
The first case describes the situation when a customer is eligible (cstmerEligOpnAcc)
and she had specified an id (idNum) by some type of document (idDocType). Moreover
the system’s information also includes that the customer is already known (she is not
a new person) and some more information (e.g., that the customer has not yet paid
her fees). If these conditions are satisfied, the system determines the name and the
address of the customer. The second case is read in a similar way. Here, the customer
has to specify her name and her address.
The following clauses partially specify the users’ behaviour or the system’s envi-
ronment. They are similar to the above scenario.
openAccAtBranche
=df “
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ ¬(fldIdNum = idNum)
∧ ¬(fldIdType = idDocType) ∧ ¬acctCreated
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldIdNum := idNum ;
fldIdType := idDocType
”
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dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ ¬acctCreated ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldCsrmerName := csrmerName ;
fldCstmerAddress := csrmerAddress
”
dc . . .
uunionsq
2.3 Formal Scenarios
The command of the system part described by a scenario combined with those of the
rest of the gathered scenarios provide the specification of the system to be constructed.
Usually, we do not construct the environment of the system. One might ask why we
then keep the command of the environment. In [KB04], we show that the specification
of the environment enables us to test the system in order to assess whether it behaves
as prescribed in its intended environment. The description of the environment specifies
the behaviour that ought to trigger reactions from the system. In other terms, the
command of the environment is the specification of the behaviour of the tester of the
system; the tester executes the command specifying the environment of the system
as described by the scenarios of its requirements. In summary, we need the command
of the system to build the system and the command of the environment to assess its
behaviour (system acceptance testing). Hence, both parts are needed since they play
different roles in the life cycle of a system.
The scenario for the above example is (openAccAtBranchs, openAccAtBranche),
defined over a state space ΣopenAccAtBranch. We cast these phenomena into a general
definition.
Definition 2.7. A (formal) scenario over a state space Σ is a pair (Cs, Ce), where
Cs and Ce are two domain-disjoint commands on Σ, called the command of the envi-
ronment and the command of the system, respectively.
In a later section we will use scenarios to formalise product families and to attach
meaning (semantics) to them.
3 Relational Semantics of Commands
3.1 Basic Commands and Feasibility
We now turn to the formalisation of our command language. Basically, a command
defines a transition relation from starting states to their possible successor states.
However, as is well known, this purely relational view is not adequate if commands
have the possibility of aborting.
If from a given starting state s there is the possibility of reaching some successor
state t, the transition relation will contain the pair (s, t). But if additionally from s
there is the possibility of aborting, this is “ignored” by the transition relation, since
it already has the “positive” information (s, t) about s.
There are various remedies to this situation. One, taken in Z (e.g. [Spi88]), is to
add a pseudo-value ⊥ to the state space that stands for abortion and to use relations
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over that extended state space. Another solution is the demonic relational semantics of
[DBS+95, DMN97] that models a total correctness view: if a state s has the possibility
of leading to abortion it is considered as unsafe and no “proper” transitions (s, t) are
included into the transition relation either.
There is a third variant which we will use in this paper because of its pleasant
algebraic properties. This is the general correctness semantics as defined in various
forms in [BGW79, Par83, BZ86, Mor87, Mor88, Bac89, Nel89, Doo94]. The idea is
to model commands as pairs consisting of a transition relation and a set of states
from which no abortion is possible. This semantics was also used in [BN94] to discuss
an operation of fair non-deterministic choice. In the present paper we will follow the
definitions in [MS06]. In this section we use a concrete relational semantics; a more
general semantics in terms of so-called modal semirings is given in Appendix B.
Definition 3.1. Consider a set Σ of states; the exact nature of its elements does
not matter.
1. A command over Σ is a pair (R,P ) where R ⊆ Σ×Σ is a transition relation and
P is a subset of Σ.
2. The restriction of a transition relation R ⊆ Σ×Σ to a subset Q ⊆ Σ is Q↓R =df
R ∩ Q× Σ.
The set P is intended to characterise those states for which the command cannot
lead to abortion.
Now we define a number of basic commands and command-forming operators
that correspond to programming constructs.
Definition 3.2.
1. The worst command abort is the one that offers no transitions and does not exclude
abortion for any state:
abort =df (∅, ∅) .
2. The program skip does not do anything; it leaves the state unchanged and cannot
lead to abortion for any state:
skip =df (I,Σ) ,
where I =df {(s, s) | s ∈ Σ} is the identity relation on states.
3. The command fail is quite peculiar; it does not offer any transitions but guarantees
that no state may lead to abortion:
fail =df (∅,Σ) .
4. The command chaos =df (Σ× Σ, ∅) is completely unpredictable.
We now define the operator dc of general non-deterministic choice.
Definition 3.3. Let C = (R,P ) and D = (S,Q) be commands. The command C dcD
is intended to behave as follows. For a starting state s non-deterministically a transi-
tion under R or S is chosen (if there is any). Absence of abortion can be guaranteed
for s iff it can be guaranteed under both C and D, i.e., iff s ∈ P ∩ Q. Therefore we
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(R,P ) dc(S,Q) =df (R ∪ S, P ∩Q) .
From Definition 3.3 it is easy to see that dc is associative, commutative and
idempotent and that fail is its neutral element. The intuition behind taking set union
in the first and intersection in the second is the following: if there is a greater choice
of transitions, the set of states from which no abortion is possible obviously may get
smaller.
Let us now see that these definitions solve the original problem of a na¨ıve rela-
tional semantics in that they distinguish commands which may lead to abortion from
those which have the same transitions but exclude abortion. A command of the first
kind is skip dc abort, one of the second kind skip by itself. Definition 3.3 yields
skip dc abort = (I,Σ) dc(∅, ∅) = (I ∪ ∅,Σ ∩ ∅) = (I, ∅) 6= (I,Σ) = skip .
On the other hand, the approach has the property that it admits all kinds of
“counterintuitive” commands such as fail or (I, ∅) that arose in our previous example.
Therefore it is reasonable to distinguish a subclass of commands which assert absence
of abortion only for those states for which they actually offer transitions. This is
captured by the following definition.
Definition 3.4. A command (R,P ) is feasible [Par83] when P ⊆ dom(R), where
dom(R) =df {s ∈ Σ | ∃ t ∈ Σ : (s, t) ∈ R} is the domain of R, i.e., the set of states
from which transitions under R emanate.
It is easy to check that feasible commands are closed under dc. The role of feasi-
bility for specification purposes will become clear later. Note that fail is not feasible.
Feasible commands are precisely the ones for which the above-mentioned demonic
semantics can be used. If C = (R,P ) is feasible then P↓R is that part of the tran-
sition of C for which abortion is excluded for its starting states, namely the ones
in P ∩ dom(R). In other words, if abortion is excluded, a successful transition is
guaranteed. Conversely, every transition R that is intended to model such a behaviour
can be represented by the feasible command (R, dom(R)). These connections are
elaborated in more detail in Appendix B.
Next, we give the formal semantics of the guarded command.
Definition 3.5. Let (R,P ) be a command and Q ⊆ Σ be a set of states. Then the
guarded command Q −→ (R,P ) (where Q is called the guard) is defined by
Q −→ (R,P ) =df (Q↓R,¬Q ∪ P ) ,
where ¬Q is the complement of Q w.r.t. Σ.
In a starting state s this command can lead to a transition only if s is both in Q and
in the domain of R; if so, all possible transitions from s under R are allowed. Hence,
abortion can be excluded if s is not in Q or in P , which explains the expression for
the second component of the command. Note that in general Q −→ (R,P ) is not
feasible even if (R,P ) is. Hence, the iterated choice B1 −→ C1 dc · · · dcBn −→ Cn
will generally also not be feasible and hence, by itself, it is not adequate for modelling
the general non-deterministic branching construct. This is remedied by the following
construct that projects a command to the “closest” feasible one.
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Definition 3.6. Given a command (R,P ), the if fi-command is defined by
if (R,P ) fi =df (R,P ∩ dom(R)) .
The relation between the commands C and if C fi will be explained further in
Lemma 3.10 in the next section. We now use this construct to derive a feasible variant
of the general non-deterministic branching construct.
Lemma 3.7. Assume sets Qi of states and commands (Ri, Pi), (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
and let
C =df Q1 −→ (R1, P1) dc · · · dcQn −→ (Rn, Pn) .
Then
C = (R,P ) =
(⋃
(Qi↓Ri),
(⋂
(¬Qi ∪ Pi)
))
,
if C fi = (R,Q ∩ P ) ,
where Q =df dom(R) =
⋃
(Qi ∩ dom(Ri)).
This means that in if Q1 −→ (R1, P1) dc · · · dcQn −→ (Rn, Pn) fi termination can
be guaranteed for a state s only if s ∈ Q, i.e., only if at least one branch is enabled
from s. That coincides with Dijkstra’s original semantics: if none of the guards opens,
the command aborts rather than fails; in particular, it is feasible by construction.
Using if fi-command we can now give a formal semantics to scenarios.
Definition 3.8. The command if Cs dcCe fi is called the command of the scenario
(Cs, Ce).
A sequential composition and, based on that, finite and infinite iteration of com-
mands can also be defined in this style. Since we do not need them here, we refer
to [MS06] for details.
3.2 Refinement and the Lattice of Commands
We now define an algebraic analogue of the refinement relation as introduced by [Bac78].
Definition 3.9. We set
(R,P ) v (S,Q) ⇔df Q ⊆ P ∧ Q↓R ⊆ S .
This relation is reflexive and transitive and hence a pre-order. However, it is not
antisymmetric. The associated equivalence relation is given by
C ≡ D ⇔df C v D ∧ D v C .
Componentwise, it works out to (R,P ) ≡ (S,Q) ⇔ P = Q ∧ P↓R = P↓S. In a
sense, the if fi-construct provides the “closest feasible refinement” of a command:
Lemma 3.10. The command if (R,P ) fi is the v-least refinement of (R,P ) that
preserves the transition R.
We have the following connection between the refinement relation and general
non-deterministic choice.
Lemma 3.11. For commands C,D we have C v D ⇔ C dcD ≡ D.
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As is known from order theory, the relation v can be transferred to the equiva-
lence classes under ≡, namely, two classes are related by v if any of their representa-
tives are. This defines now a partial order on equivalence classes of commands. In the
sequel we will work with such equivalence classes, but always denote them by suitable
representatives.
The above lemma implies that (the equivalence class of) C dcD is the least upper
bound of (the equivalence classes of) C and D w.r.t. v.
However, it turns out that, for commands, there is also a greatest-lower-bound
operator which will be important for the combination operator on scenarios we are
going to define.
Lemma 3.12. The greatest lower bound of commands (R,P ) and (S,Q) w.r.t. v is
(R,P ) u (S,Q) = ((R ∩ S) ∪ (¬P↓S) ∪ (¬Q↓R), P ∪Q) .
Moreover, dc and u distribute over each other, i.e., the commands form even a dis-
tributive lattice.
We call the operator u consistent non-deterministic choice: if both argument
commands offer transitions from a state, only the ones common to both are possible.
There is no neutral element of this operator. However, chaos is neutral up to the
equivalence ≡ . Formally, chaos u (R,P ) 6= (R,P ), but chaos u (R,P ) ≡ (R,P ) .
As we already have pointed out, the feasible commands are of particular interest.
However, unlike in the case of dc, they are not closed under the u operator. It turns
out, though, that for two transition relations R and S the greatest lower bound of the
feasible commands (R, dom(R)) and (S, dom(S)) is feasible again iff
dom(R ∩ S) = dom(R) ∩ dom(S) .
This means that for every state in the intersection of their domains R and S have
to offer at least one common transition. This property is central for allowing an
integration of commands based on R and S into a common one.
Definition 3.13. Two relations R,S are integrable iff
dom(R ∩ S) = dom(R) ∩ dom(S) .
When the functional requirements of a system or a family are given in terms
of scenarios, one has to reckon with inconsistency among the given scenarios. Func-
tional inconsistency arises when the transition relations of the scenarios are not inte-
grable [DFK+98]. A further source of inconsistency is dictionary inconsistency (a.k.a.
naming inconsistency) [ACD+01, DFK+98]. The detection of functional inconsistency
can be partially automated, and a prototype tool called SCENATOR is presented
in [DKM05, KWS03].
4 Formal Scenarios as a Product Family Algebra
As stated in the introduction, our objective is to provide a semantic model of product
family algebra in terms of scenarios. To achieve this, we need to provide concrete
definitions for the two product family algebra operators + and · and to provide explicit
definitions of 0 and 1. As we have seen, a single scenario provides a specification of
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one particular system. If we identify a single scenario with a possible/feasible product
then sets of scenarios can be used to argue about product families and product lines.
In the remainder we assume that all scenarios work on a common state space. If the
state spaces of the scenarios are not the same one can extend them to a common
one [DFK+98].
Definition 4.1. Let SC =df (Cs, Ce) and SD =df (Ds, De) be two scenarios on a
common state space. The scenario SC · SD is defined by
SC · SD =df (Cs uDs, Ce dcDe) .
If Cs and Ds are not integrable, we say that the scenarios SC and SD are system-
inconsistent . Otherwise, SC · SD is called the dot-integration of SC and SD.
Informally, the operation · is justified as follows. The environment (in our example
the customer of the bank) acts in an arbitrary way. Hence we model its choice between
the actions of Ce and De by general non-deterministic choice. In contrast to that, the
system (in our example the bank) has to react to each action of the environment as
defensively as possible. In order to stay consistent, the sets of actions to which Cs
and Ds react must be the same; hence we use consistent choice there.
This definition explains why we are using the more complex setting of commands
rather than that of pure relations with a demonic interpretation: the demonic meet
is a partial operation, whereas a product family algebra needs a total operation. And
the demonic meet is faithfully represented by the meet u of commands, which is total.
The formal scenario 1sc =df (chaos, fail) can be viewed as the closed system that
can be built from all the given scenarios. Its environment does not have any effect
on any environment of the given formal scenarios. It is the neutral element w.r.t. the
combination operator · modulo the equivalence ≡. Moreover, it is easy to see that the
operation is associative, commutative and idempotent.
If one wants to model the whole specification from the user’s perspective, one
might argue that the system behaves more or less arbitrarily. Hence one can define
the symmetric (dual) operation ·δ by
SC ·δ SD =df (Cs dcDs, Ce uDe) .
If Ce and De are not integrable, we say that the scenarios SC and SD are environment-
inconsistent . Otherwise, SC ·δ SD is called the ·δ-integration (or dual dot-integration
of SC and SD. All the presented theory works also for this operation.
The formal scenario 1δsc =df (fail, chaos) specifies a system that involves all the
consistent commands of the system corresponding to all the scenarios given to us. Its
environment command can be refined by all the commands of the environment of all
the scenarios.
For two sets S and T of scenarios, the operator · is lifted pointwise to sets of
scenarios, i.e., S ·T =df {SC ·SD |SC ∈ S, SD ∈ T }. Based on that we can now define
a product family algebra for scenarios.
Theorem 4.2. Let M be a set of scenarios that is closed under · and contains 1sc.
Then the structure SC =df (P(M),∪, ∅, ·, {1sc}) is a product family algebra. Under
analogous conditions (P(M),∪, ∅, ·δ, {1δsc}) is a product family algebra.
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By this we have defined a class of product family algebras which allow semantic
reasoning. The natural order there corresponds to set inclusion ⊆ .
In the literature, terms like product, feature and subfamily lack an exact defini-
tion. In [HKM06a, HKM06, HKM09], we find the algebraic definitions for these terms
based on product family algebra. For example a product is defined as follows.
Definition 4.3. [HKM09] Assume a product family algebra F = (S,+, 0, ·, 1). An
element a ∈ S is said to be a product if it satisfies the following laws:
∀ b ∈ S : b ≤ a ⇒ (b = 0 ∨ b = a) ,
∀ b, c ∈ S : a ≤ b + c ⇒ (a ≤ b ∨ a ≤ c) .
A product a is proper if a 6= 0.
Intuitively, this means that a product cannot be divided using the choice operator +.
Or in other terms, it does not offer optional or alternative features. In SC, exactly
the sets with at most one member are products.
Analogously to Definition 4.3, a feature can be defined by indivisibility; this time
w.r.t. multiplication rather than addition [HKM09]. Unfortunately, the definition is
not useful in the present context: e.g., an indivisible part of a transition relation would
be a single pair of states; it is not realistic to describe a complete system as the dot-
integration of the respective commands. Further details on this are beyond the scope
of the paper.
5 Illustrative Example and Further Applications
5.1 Informal Description of a Product Family
We now make our simple banking example into a proper family. For reasons of space we
only give the informal description and merely sketch the formalisation; the principles
should be clear from the earlier examples.
Let us assume that a software development department of a bank operating
world-wide has a software product family to address its specific banking operations
in several countries. The family enables several ways of opening accounts. All the
products of the banking software family include a feature that allows customers to
open an account when they visit a branch of the bank; this is formally described by
the scenario openAccAtBranch from Section 2.2. Certainly, a product will contain
several additional features related to other core banking activities, described by a
scenario restOfCoreBnkgSystem.
Our product family allows the optionality of a feature openAccountOnline to
open an account online and a feature openAccountByMail to open an account by
sending the application and the needed documents by mail.
The scenario corresponding to openAccountOnline is the following: the customer
logs into the website of the bank corresponding to her country of residence. She then
selects the open account operation. The system retrieves the appropriate eForm for
opening an account. The customer fills in the field corresponding to her identification
number and the type of identification document. If she is already recorded in the sys-
tem, it displays the remaining information needed and proposes personalized account
privileges. Otherwise, the system displays that the customer is new, asks for her full
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name and address, and assigns to the account the standard banking privileges. If the
customer accepts the privileges, the system asks the customer to enter the data of a
valid major credit card to pay for the opening fees. If the data are valid, the system
issues a receipt containing the account number and a message stating that the card
associated with the opened account will be handed to her at her first visit to one of the
bank branches. Otherwise, after the third attempt the system aborts the operation
and goes back to the main bank webpage.
The scenario corresponding to openAccountByMail reads as follows. If the coun-
try of residence of the customer is a member of the Universal Postal Union and the
mail services of that country are considered as reliable by the bank, a customer can
open an account using the mail. She sends an application for opening an account
with one original identification document and the fees for opening the account. When
the bank receives the application, an appropriate identification document, and the
opening fees, it proceeds to the opening of the account and issues a card associated
to the account. The process is similar to that for opening an account at a branch. It
then returns by mail the identification document and the issued card to the customer.
The account is considered open from the time the bank posts the card.
5.2 Formal Specification of the Family
The product family algebra model (FAM) of the above family is the following:
BankingFamily =
openAccAtBranch · (1sc + openAccountOnline + openAccountByMail)
· restOfCoreBnkgSystem
The scenarios openAccAtBranch and restOfCoreBnkgSystem are integrable with
openAccountOnline and with openAccountByMail. However, openAccountOnline
and openAccountByMail are not integrable since they treat for example the issued
bank card differently. It is common practice that, whenever such an inconsistency
is detected, the specifier asks the stakeholders owning the inconsistent scenarios to
discuss the problem in order to resolve it.
5.3 Model Transformations
For instance, to generate the specification of the commonality of the above family, we
proceed as follows:
1. We identify the maximal product (according to the understanding given by Def-
inition 4.3) that is common to all the members of the family. This product is
formed as the dot-integration of the features common to all the members. From
the above expression we can derive, by associativity and commutativity, that this
is openAccAtBranch · restOfCoreBnkgSystem. Of course, this extraction of the
commonality can also easily be automated; see for instance the prototype tool
described in [HKM06a]. If the detailed expressions for the scenarios are analysed
further, parts common to just two of them may be identified (see the phrase “The
process is similar to that for opening an account at a branch” in the informal spec-
ification of openAccountByMail); this provides a way of refactoring specifications
and implementations.
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2. We replace each of the scenarios that occur in the above commonality specification
by its corresponding formal scenarios to perform, if possible (i.e., when all the
relations of the system of all the scenarios are consistent), their dot-integration.
Note that dot-integration is associative and commutative and therefore the order
in which we integrate the scenario does not matter.
3. In the same way, we can build the specification of each potential member of this
example family when that is possible. Also, the specification of any sub-family can
be generated in the same way.
4. Since we are building on an algebra of commands, efficiency-increasing transfor-
mations using the relation ≡ are also semantics-preserving and hence admissible.
However, the definition of product family so far does not take a refinement relation
like v into account; this will be the subject of further work.
5.4 Applications to Other Semantic Models
We have seen how the approach works in a concrete semantic algebra of basic features
based on commands. To show that it is more generally applicable we sketch three
envisaged other semantic algebras.
A first idea is to define something in between the purely syntactic algebra, where
products are just strings of feature names, and the purely semantic command algebra
without a useful set of atomic features. In the new algebra one might use triples
(x,Ce, Cs) as atomic features, where x is a feature name and (Ce, Cs) is a scenario.
The elements of a corresponding product family algebra could then be sets of bags of
such triples, where every bag has, for a given name x, only identical triples, if any.
This allows identification and counting and still offers a semantic interpretation of
features and products.
A second idea is to use as elements of a product family algebra sets consisting of
unordered feature structure forests (FSFs) in the sense of [ALM+10] with commuta-
tive superimposition as the interpretation for composition.
A third idea is to form a product family algebra based on stream processing
functions (e.g. [BS01]) using the ⊗ operator of component composition as the inter-
pretation for composition.
All such applications would open the possibility of an algebraic treatment of view
reconciliation and feature interaction along the lines of [HKM09] in those areas.
6 Related Work
It is a common belief in the requirements community that scenario-based or use-case-
based descriptions or requirement specifications help to reduce the effort of model
construction [UBC09]. The CREWS1 group has visited twelve projects in Germany
and Switzerland that used scenarios in their software engineering process in one way
or another [AEG+98]. The survey revealed that scenarios are flexible and broadly
applicable. The excessive complexity of typical software systems makes monolithic
software specifications beyond the grasp of most software engineers and most soft-
ware users. Scenarios allow us to structure complex specifications as aggregates of
simple scenarios describing the user/environment system interactions. It allows us to
1 Co-operative Requirements Engineering With Scenarios
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address the inability of typical users to understand formal requirements specifications
by allowing them to provide the specifier with informal descriptions of the system in
response to a business event. By virtue of their provision for covering systematically
all relevant aspects of given requirements, scenarios help addressing the difficulty to
elicit and capture user requirements in a systematic, verifiable manner.
Model-driven development is a paradigm that helps to address several problems
related to composition and integration of systems from parts. Recently several at-
tempts were made to formally extend the use of model-driven development to prod-
uct families. Scha¨tz [Sch07] proposes an integrated approach for variability modeling
and model-based development and illustrates a possible tool-support based on it.
Thaker et al. [TBK+07] introduce a technique to synthesize programs of a software
product line by composing modules that implement features. They focus mainly on
low-level implementation constraints such as features referencing elements that are
defined in other feature modules and on assuring that all programs in a product line
do not reference undefined classes, methods, and variables.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a mathematical framework that enables the transition from a fam-
ily model and a set of initial models into derived models of the family members, of
the commonality of the family or of any of its sub-families. The family model is a
product family algebra term. Each of the other initial models is a formal scenario
that captures environment-system interaction. Obtaining the model of a member is
done through dot-integration of all its formal scenarios. Through this integration, in-
consistency can be detected upon verification. When a concrete model of a family is
derived, an additional verification is performed on the consistency of alternative fea-
tures (formal scenarios). Indeed, ·δ-integration (or dual dot-integration) requires that
the environments of alternative formal scenarios need to be consistent; otherwise they
cannot be taken as alternatives. From the perspective of our work the analysis activi-
ties that are performed in monolithic software development can be seen as treating the
special case of a singleton family. The usual verification of requirements consistency
and completeness are basic activities in the model construction and transformation
process that we propose.
In [MPK+10], Me´ndez Ferna´ndez et al. point to the need for precise structure,
syntax and semantics of requirements documents in order to ensure precise require-
ments. They propose a meta-model for artefact-orientation. The language of product
family algebra can be used in articulating the artefact abstraction model that they
propose. The family model obtained after instantiating the features with their cor-
responding formal scenarios provides a part of the artefact content. We envision a
requirements documentation technique that uses the language of product families,
scenarios, and commands. It would be a significant step towards attaining precise
requirements that can evolve despite the volatility of some of the requirements of the
documented product family.
One of the inherent risks with modelling is that by raising the level of abstraction
one might oversimplify to such an extent that no details are left for answering useful
questions. However, by adopting several levels of abstraction such that each lower
level is derived from a higher one by instantiating its elements, one can use the model
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at the appropriate level of abstraction to answer a question without dealing with
unnecessary details. In our case, our high level is the family specification expressed
in terms of black boxes called features. The next level consists of formal scenarios
expressed using commands that instantiate the features of the family. The obtained
detailed model can answer questions such as system correctness and environment
adequacy.
The contributions to model driven development of the requirements that we have
reported in this paper are two-fold. First, we set up a mathematical background for
formal derivation of high level requirements to a more concrete level. Second, our ap-
proach deals with expected changes through the adoption of a family approach as well
as with unexpected ones by having a mathematical setting that enhances automation.
Indeed, based on the mathematics presented one can easily construct tools to perform
model transformation and the verification of family-models. A change to a software
family touches either the product family algebra term that specifies it or its set of for-
mal scenarios. Then, through automation, the models of the members, sub-families,
commonality, and other possible submodels are updated. Once the generated models
are obtained, a further analysis needs to be performed in order to assess the effect of
the constraints placed upon them by an existing product line architecture. Therefore,
some of the derived models are possible but not viable due to these constraints.
The proposed approach improves quality by encouraging reuse of already exist-
ing formal scenarios, building on the family commonalities, and easily coping with
change in the requirements. The reuse is enhanced through the verification allowed
by dot-integration, which enables verifying whether a scenario can be composed from
already existing ones. The approach enhances consistency verification not only of the
behaviour of the system but also of that of its environment. For instance, if two scenar-
ios are alternative, the proposed approach enables verifying whether their respective
required environments are consistent or not. The consistency verification can partially
be automated [KWS03], which enhances the scalability of the approach, since many
of the tasks of the verification are repetitive and can be delegated to mechanized
mathematics machinery such as theorem provers and computer algebra systems.
Once a requirements model of a family member is obtained, the work presented
in [KB04] shows how it can be used to derive the member’s functional architectural de-
sign. The relation of the environment is used for acceptance and system testing [KB04].
It constitutes the specification of the tester; the tester needs to act according to the
relation of the environment.
The proposed technique is confined to functional requirements. Aspects such as a
system’s performance are not addressed. We simply focus on the models that capture
the business functionality and behaviour, which commonly are called Platform Inde-
pendent Model (PIM). Our earlier work on view reconciliation [HKM09] can be used
in some typical applications to generate Platform Specific Models (PSM). However,
additional investigation is needed to develop techniques to incorporate non-functional
requirements (overall qualities) of the system in the model transformation.
Some systems, by their nature, exhibit an inherent architecture that might involve
several agents that act concurrently. Our future work aims at involving the inherent
architecture of the family in the integration of the features.
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Appendix
A The Banking Example Completed
A.1 Formalisation of the scenario openAccAtBranch
To describe the whole banking system, we start to explain members of the state space:
cstmerEligOpnAcc a customer is eligible to open an account
idNum an arbitrary identification number provided by the cus-
tomer
idDocType type of the identification document, e.g., passport.
fldIdNum an arbitrary identification number provided by the cus-
tomer
fldIdType an arbitrary type of the identification document pro-
vided by the customer
newCstmer a customer is new
acctCreated an account has been created
acctprivileges a type of privileges that the bank assign to a customer,
which can be standard or personalized
prvlgesAccepted the customer has accepted the privileges
feesPayed the fees for opening the account are payed
crdIssued a card associated with the account is issued
outputMssge a message from the system to the user
csrmerName an arbitrary customer’s name
csrmerAddress an arbitrary customer’s address
fldCsrmerName customer’s name as entered to the system
fldCstmerAddress customer’s address as entered to the system
getCstmerName(idNum) system function to get the name of the customer from
an internal replace3datedata store
getCstmerAddress(idNum) system function to get customer’s address from an in-
ternal replace3datedata store
personalized the personalized privilege
standard the standard privilege
msgeAccptPrvlges? a message from the system asking whether the customer
accepts the proposed privilege
msgIsPaymntOK? a message from the system asking whether the payment
received by mail is satisfactory
DisplayOpnAcctForm() the appropriate eForm for opening an account
cntryServedByPge the country served by the eForm
cntryMemberOfUPU a Boolean to indicate whether the country is served by
the Universal Postal Union
cntryMailSrvceReliable a Boolean to indicate whether the mail service is reliable
with the country
cntryOfRsdnce customer’s country of residence
fldOperation an arbitrary type of banking operation such as opening
an account
openAcctOp a banking operation for opening an account
eForm an arbitrary type of eForms
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fldCreditCard an arbitrary type for credit card numbers
creditCardNum a credit card number
fldCrdtCrdExpry an arbitrary type for credit card expiry dates
crdCrdExpryDate a credit card expiry date
msgMailOpenAcct a message from the system indicating that the customer
can be served by mail
validCrd(num, date) a Boolean to indicate whether the card with the given
number and expiry date is valid
msgCardDelivery a message from the system indicating that the card is
delivered to the customer
msgeCardToBeSent a message from the system indicating that the card is
to be sent to the customer
onHold indicates that the card is on hold at the branch of the
bank
sentByMail indicates that the card is sent by mail
attempts the number of attempts to use a credit card
mainBankSite the main web-page of the bank operations
receiptIssued a Boolean indicating whether a receipt has been issued
for the fees
idDocSent a Boolean indicating whether the customer has sent her
identification document
idDocRcved a Boolean indicating whether the bank has received the
customer’s identification document
mailAppRcved a Boolean indicating whether the bank has received the
customer’s application
mailApplSent a Boolean indicating whether the customer has sent her
application by mail
feesSent a Boolean indicating whether the customer has sent fees
by mail
feesRcvd a Boolean indicating whether the bank has received the
fees by mail
As shown in [DFK+98], the scenario openAccAtBranch gives a partial description
of the behaviour of the system as well as of its environment. It can be translated
directly into a guarded conditional statement as follows:
openAccAtBranch
=df
if
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ ¬(fldIdNum = idNum)
∧ ¬(fldIdType = idDocType) ∧ ¬acctCreated
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldIdNum := idNum; fldIdType := idDocType
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ ¬acctCreated ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldCsrmerName := getCstmerName(idNum)
; fldCstmerAddress := getCstmerAddress(idNum)
”
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dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ ¬acctCreated ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldCsrmerName := csrmerName; fldCstmerAddress := csrmerAddress
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
−→ acctprivileges := personalized; outputMssge := msgeAccptPrvlges?
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
−→ prvlgesAccepted := true
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted
−→ acctCreated := true; crdIssued := true
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType
−→ acctprivileges := standard; outputMssge := msgeAccptPrvlges?
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldIdNum = idNum ∧ fldIdType = idDocType
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
−→ prvlgesAccepted := true
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldIdNum = idNum ∧ fldIdType = idDocType
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted
−→ acctCreated := true; crdIssued := true
”
fi
The above specification openAccAtBranch includes the behaviours of the system
as well as that of its environment as given by the scenario. We can work out from
openAccAtBranch the part of the specification that concerns the behaviour of the sys-
tem openAccAtBranchs and that of its environment openAccAtBranche. Since at each
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time, we have a choice between an action performed by the system or by its environ-
ment, we always have openAccAtBranch = if openAccAtBranchs dc openAccAtBranche fi.
Explicitly, openAccAtBranchs is as follows:
openAccAtBranchs
=df“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ ¬acctCreated ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldCsrmerName := getCstmerName(idNum)
; fldCstmerAddress := getCstmerAddress(idNum)
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
−→ acctprivileges := personalized; outputMssge := msgeAccptPrvlges?
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted
−→ acctCreated := true; crdIssued := true
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType
−→ acctprivileges := standard; outputMssge := msgeAccptPrvlges?
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldIdNum = idNum ∧ fldIdType = idDocType
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted
−→ acctCreated := true; crdIssued := true
”
Next, we give the specification of the behaviour of the environment:
openAccAtBranche
=df“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ ¬(fldIdNum = idNum)
∧ ¬(fldIdType = idDocType) ∧ ¬acctCreated
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldIdNum := idNum; fldIdType := idDocType
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ ¬acctCreated ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
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∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldCsrmerName := csrmerName; fldCstmerAddress := csrmerAddress
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
−→ prvlgesAccepted := true
”
dc
“
cstmerEligOpnAcc ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldIdNum = idNum ∧ fldIdType = idDocType
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
−→ prvlgesAccepted := true
”
A.2 Formalisation of the scenario openAccountOnline
The scenario corresponding to openAccountOnline is the following:
“The customer logs in to the website of the bank corresponding to her country
of residence. She then selects open account operation. The system retrieves the ap-
propriate eForm for opening an account. The customer fills in the field corresponding
to her identification number and the type of identification document. If the customer
is an existing customer, the system displays that the remaining needed information
and proposes a personalized account privileges. Otherwise, the system displays thatt
the customer is a new one, asks for her full name and address, and assigns to the
account the standard banking privileges. If the customer accepts the privileges, the
system asks the customer to enter the number and expiry date of one of the major
credit cards to pay for the opening fees. If the entered card is valid, the system issues
a receipt containing the account number and a message stating that the card asso-
ciated with the opened account will be handed to her at her first visit to one of the
bank branches. Otherwise, after the third attempt the system aborts the operation
and goes back to the main bank webpage.”
openAccountOnline
=df
if
“
cntryOfRsdnce = cntryServedByPge
∧ ¬(fldOperation = openAcctOp) −→ fldOperation := openAcctOp
”
dc
“
cntryOfRsdnce = cntryServedByPge ∧ fldOperation = openAcctOp
−→ eForm := DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge)
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ ¬(fldIdNum = idNum)
∧ ¬(fldIdType = idDocType) ∧ ¬acctCreated
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldIdNum := idNum; fldIdType := idDocType
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ ¬acctCreated ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
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∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldCsrmerName := getCstmerName(idNum)
; fldCstmerAddress := getCstmerAddress(idNum)
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ ¬acctCreated ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldCsrmerName := csrmerName; fldCstmerAddress := csrmerAddress
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum) ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
−→ acctprivileges := personalized; outputMssge := msgeAccptPrvlges?
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted −→ prvlgesAccepted := true
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted −→ prvlgesAccepted := true
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ outputMssge := msgIsPaymntOK?
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ outputMssge := msgIsPaymntOK?
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
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−→ fldCreditCard := creditCardNum; fldCrdtCrdExpry := crdCrdExpryDate
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ fldCreditCard := creditCardNum; fldCrdtCrdExpry := crdCrdExpryDate
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ fldCreditCard = creditCardNum
∧ fldCrdtCrdExpry = crdCrdExpryDate ∧ attempts ≤ 2
−→ feesPayed := validCrd(creditCardNum, crdCrdExpryDate)
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ fldCreditCard = creditCardNum
∧ fldCrdtCrdExpry = crdCrdExpryDate ∧ attempts ≤ 2
−→ feesPayed := validCrd(creditCardNum, crdCrdExpryDate)
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ fldCreditCard = creditCardNum
∧ fldCrdtCrdExpry = crdCrdExpryDate ∧ ¬(attempts ≤ 2)
−→ eForm := mainBankSite
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ fldCreditCard = creditCardNum
∧ fldCrdtCrdExpry = crdCrdExpryDate ∧ ¬(attempts ≤ 2)
−→ eForm := mainBankSite
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ feesPayed
−→ acctCreated := true; crdIssued := onHold
”
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dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ feesPayed
−→acctCreated := true; crdIssued := onHold
; receiptIssued := true; outputMssge := msgCardDelivery
”
fi
In a similar way as for the previous scenario, we work out the specification of the
system and that of its environment as given by the scenario openAccountOnline.
openAccountOnlines
=df“
cntryOfRsdnce = cntryServedByPge
∧ ¬(fldOperation = openAcctOp) −→ fldOperation := openAcctOp
”
dc
“
cntryOfRsdnce = cntryServedByPge ∧ fldOperation = openAcctOp
−→ eForm := DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge)
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ ¬acctCreated ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldCsrmerName := getCstmerName(idNum)
; fldCstmerAddress := getCstmerAddress(idNum)
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum) ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
−→ acctprivileges := personalized; outputMssge := msgeAccptPrvlges?
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ outputMssge := msgIsPaymntOK?
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ outputMssge := msgIsPaymntOK?
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
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∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ fldCreditCard = creditCardNum
∧ fldCrdtCrdExpry = crdCrdExpryDate ∧ attempts ≤ 2
−→ feesPayed := validCrd(creditCardNum, crdCrdExpryDate)
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ fldCreditCard = creditCardNum
∧ fldCrdtCrdExpry = crdCrdExpryDate ∧ attempts ≤ 2
−→ feesPayed := validCrd(creditCardNum, crdCrdExpryDate)
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ fldCreditCard = creditCardNum
∧ fldCrdtCrdExpry = crdCrdExpryDate ∧ ¬(attempts ≤ 2)
−→ eForm := mainBankSite
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ fldCreditCard = creditCardNum
∧ fldCrdtCrdExpry = crdCrdExpryDate ∧ ¬(attempts ≤ 2)
−→ eForm := mainBankSite
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ feesPayed
−→ acctCreated := true; crdIssued := onHold
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ feesPayed
−→acctCreated := true; crdIssued := onHold
; receiptIssued := true; outputMssge := msgCardDelivery
”
The specification of the environment as given by the scenario openAccountOnline
is the following:
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openAccountOnlinee
=df“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ ¬(fldIdNum = idNum)
∧ ¬(fldIdType = idDocType) ∧ ¬acctCreated
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldIdNum := idNum; fldIdType := idDocType
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ ¬acctCreated ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldCsrmerName := csrmerName; fldCstmerAddress := csrmerAddress
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted −→ prvlgesAccepted := true
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted −→ prvlgesAccepted := true
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ fldCreditCard := creditCardNum; fldCrdtCrdExpry := crdCrdExpryDate
”
dc
“
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ fldCreditCard := creditCardNum; fldCrdtCrdExpry := crdCrdExpryDate
”
A.3 Formalisation of the scenario openAccountByMail
The scenario corresponding to openAccountByMail states the following:
“If the country of residence of the customer is a member of the Universal Postal
Union and the mail services of that country are considered as reliable by the bank, a
customer can open an account using the mail. She sends an application for opening an
account with one original identification document and the fees for opening the account.
When the bank receives the application, an appropriate identification document, and
the opening fees, it proceeds to the opening of the account and issues a card associated
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to the account. The process is similar to that for opening an account at a branch. It
then returns by mail the identification document and the issued card to the customer.
The account is considered open from the time the bank posts the card.”
Due to the ambiguity in the text of the above scenario, the specifier has to clarify
some of the scenario requirements. For example, what does it mean “The process is
similar to that for opening an account at a branch”? In the specification below, we
stayed as close as possible to the scenario for opening an account at a branch. For that
we assumed for example that, when opening an account by mail, the client accepts
the system’s proposed privileges. We assumed as well that an agent from the bank
on the client’s behalf will be entering to the bank software system all the information
required by the account opening process.
openAccountByMail
=df
if
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
−→ outputMssge := msgMailOpenAcct
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
−→ mailApplSent := true; idDocSent := true; feesSent := true
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable ∧ mailAppRcved
∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent ∧ cntryOfRsdnce = cntryServedByPge
∧ ¬(fldOperation = openAcctOp) −→ fldOperation := openAcctOp
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ cntryOfRsdnce = cntryServedByPge ∧ fldOperation = openAcctOp
−→ eForm := DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge)
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ ¬(fldIdNum = idNum)
∧ ¬(fldIdType = idDocType) ∧ ¬acctCreated
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldIdNum := idNum; fldIdType := idDocType
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ ¬acctCreated ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldCsrmerName := getCstmerName(idNum)
; fldCstmerAddress := getCstmerAddress(idNum)
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ ¬acctCreated ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
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∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldCsrmerName := csrmerName; fldCstmerAddress := csrmerAddress
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum) ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
−→ acctprivileges := personalized; outputMssge := msgeAccptPrvlges?
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted −→ prvlgesAccepted := true
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted −→ prvlgesAccepted := true
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ outputMssge := msgIsPaymntOK?
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ outputMssge := msgIsPaymntOK?
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
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∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ feesRcvd := true; feesPayed := true
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ feesRcvd := true; feesPayed := true
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ feesPayed
−→ acctCreated := true; crdIssued := sentByMail
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ feesPayed
−→acctCreated := true; crdIssued := sentByMail
; receiptIssued := true; outputMssge := msgeCardToBeSent
”
fi
In a similar way as for the previous scenario, we work out the specification of the
system and that of its environment from the scenario openAccountByMail.
openAccountByMails
=df“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
−→ outputMssge := msgMailOpenAcct
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable ∧ mailAppRcved
∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent ∧ cntryOfRsdnce = cntryServedByPge
∧ ¬(fldOperation = openAcctOp) −→ fldOperation := openAcctOp
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
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∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ cntryOfRsdnce = cntryServedByPge ∧ fldOperation = openAcctOp
−→ eForm := DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge)
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ ¬acctCreated ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldCsrmerName := getCstmerName(idNum)
; fldCstmerAddress := getCstmerAddress(idNum)
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum) ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
−→ acctprivileges := personalized; outputMssge := msgeAccptPrvlges?
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ outputMssge := msgIsPaymntOK?
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ outputMssge := msgIsPaymntOK?
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ feesPayed
−→ acctCreated := true; crdIssued := sentByMail
”
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dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ feesPayed
−→acctCreated := true; crdIssued := sentByMail
; receiptIssued := true; outputMssge := msgeCardToBeSent
”
The specification of the environment as given by the scenario openAccountByMail
is the following:
openAccountByMaile
=df“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
−→ mailApplSent := true; idDocSent := true; feesSent := true
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ ¬(fldIdNum = idNum)
∧ ¬(fldIdType = idDocType) ∧ ¬acctCreated
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldIdNum := idNum; fldIdType := idDocType
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ ¬acctCreated ∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted
∧ ¬feesPayed ∧ ¬crdIssued
−→ fldCsrmerName := csrmerName; fldCstmerAddress := csrmerAddress
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted −→ prvlgesAccepted := true
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ ¬prvlgesAccepted −→ prvlgesAccepted := true
”
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dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ feesRcvd := true; feesPayed := true
”
dc
“
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = csrmerName ∧ fldCstmerAddress = csrmerAddress
∧ acctprivileges = standard ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ ¬feesPayed
−→ feesRcvd := true; feesPayed := true
”
A.4 Formal Specification of the family
The product family algebra model (FAM) of the considered family is the following:
BankingFamily =
openAccAtBranch · (1sc + openAccountOnline + openAccountByMail)
· restOfCoreBnkgSystem
The scenarios openAccAtBranch and restOfCoreBnkgSystem are integrable with
openAccountOnline and with openAccountByMail. However, openAccountOnline
and openAccountByMail are not integrable since they treat for example the issued
bank card differently. Indeed, the following commands from openAccountOnlines and
from openAccountByMails, respectively, do not offer a common transition from their
common domains.(
eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgeAccptPrvlges?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ feesPayed
−→ acctCreated := true; crdIssued := onHold
)
(
cntryMemberOfUPU ∧ cntryMailSrvceReliable
∧ mailAppRcved ∧ idDocRcved ∧ feesSent
∧ eForm = DisplayOpnAcctForm(cntryServedByPge) ∧ fldIdNum = idNum
∧ fldIdType = idDocType ∧ ¬newCstmer
∧ fldCsrmerName = getCstmerName(idNum)
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∧ fldCstmerAddress = getCstmerAddress(idNum)
∧ acctprivileges = personalized ∧ outputMssge = msgIsPaymntOK?
∧ prvlgesAccepted ∧ feesPayed
−→ acctCreated := true; crdIssued := sentByMail
)
It is common practice that, whenever such an inconsistency is detected, the spec-
ifier asks the stakeholders owning the inconsistent scenarios to discuss the problem in
order to resolve it.
B Algebraic Semantics of Commands
B.1 Modal Semirings
We will model programs algebraically using elements of a so-called modal semiring S;
the precise definitions will be given below. The idea is that the elements of S model
sets of transitions from program states to program states. A particular subset of the
elements, the tests, model sets of states or, equivalently, assertions about program
states.
Formally, an idempotent semiring is a structure (S,+, 0, ·, 1) satisfying the fol-
lowing axioms.
– The substructure (S,+, 0) is a commutative and idempotent monoid. This induces
the natural order a ≤ b ⇔df a+ b = b w.r.t. which 0 is the least element and a+ b
is the join of a and b.
– The substructure (S, ·, 1) is a monoid.
– Composition · distributes over sum in both arguments, i.e., (a+ b) · c = a · c+ b · c
and a · (b + c) = a · b + a · c.
– The element 0 is a left and right annihilator w.r.t. composition, i.e., 0·a = 0 = a·0.
In most applications these operators are interpreted as follows:
+ ↔ choice, · ↔ sequential composition,
0 ↔ empty choice, 1 ↔ null action,
≤ ↔ increase in information or in choice possibilities.
A prominent idempotent semiring is the set of all binary relations over a set W
with union as + and relational composition as · .
A test in an idempotent semiring is a subidentity p ≤ 1 that has a complement
¬p relative to 1, i.e., p · ¬p = 0 = ¬p · p and p + ¬p = 1. If p characterises a set S
of states then ¬p characterises its complement. Note that the complement operation
¬ is required only for tests, not for general semiring elements, which allows a much
wider class of models. The set of all tests of S is denoted by test(S).
In the relation semiring, the tests are the subidentities of the form ∆V =df
{(x, x) | x ∈ V } for subsets V ⊆ W . So ∆V can represent V as a relation and hence
model the predicate characterising V .
The above definition of tests deviates slightly from that in [Koz97] in that it
does not allow an arbitrary Boolean algebra of subidentities as test(S) but only the
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maximal complemented one. The reason is that the axiomatisation of domain to be
presented below forces this maximality anyway (see [DMS06]).
Straightforward calculations show that test(S) forms a Boolean algebra with +
as join, · as meet and 0 and 1 as its least and greatest elements. We will consistently
write a, b, c . . . for arbitrary semiring elements and p, q, r, . . . for tests. When tests are
viewed as predicates over a set W of possible worlds, the semiring operators play the
following roles:
0 / 1 ↔ false (empty set) / true (full set W ),
+ / · ↔ disjunction (union) / conjunction (intersection),
≤ ↔ implication (subsethood),
p · a / a · p ↔ input / output restriction of a by p,
p · a · q ↔ the part of a taking p-elements to q-elements. (∗)
An important property of tests is the following [Mo¨l04]: if the meet a u b exists
then also p · a u b and p · a u p · b with
p · (a u b) = p · a u b = p · a u p · b. (2.1)
To ease reading, we will write ∧ and ∨ instead of · and + when both of their
arguments are tests (metalogical conjunction and disjunction will be denoted with
the larger ∧ and ∨ to avoid confusion). Also, we will freely use the standard Boolean
operations on test(S), for instance implication p→ q =df ¬p + q.
To complete our setting we now introduce a domain operator. Given an element
a the test pa, the domain of a, characterises those states from which a-transitions are
possible.
Formally, a modal semiring is a structure (S,+, 0, ·, 1, p) such that (S,+, 0, ·, 1)
is an idempotent semiring and the operator p : S −→ test(S) satisfies the ax-
ioms [DMS06]
a ≤ pa · a, p(p · a) ≤ p, p(a · b) = p(a · pb).
In a modal semiring we can define the modal diamond and box operators 〈 〉, [ ] :
S −→ (test(S) −→ test(S)) as
〈a〉p =df p(a · p), [a]p =df ¬〈a〉¬p.
This specifies [a]q as the abstract counterpart of the weakest liberal precondition
predicate transformer wlp [Dij76], with p ≤ [a]q representing the partial correctness
semantics of the Hoare triple {p} a {q}.
B.2 Commands and Correctness
Over a modal semiring we can abstractly model programs with a general correctness
view (i.e., “miraculous” behaviour is possible; we will later connect this to the total
correctness view and demonic semantics.
Programs are modelled as commands [Nel89, MS06] taken from the set COM(S) =df
S× test(S). In a command (a, p) the element a ∈ S describes the possible state transi-
tions and p ∈ test(S) characterises the states with guaranteed termination. All states
characterised by ¬p have the “result” of infinite looping besides any proper states
that may be reached from them under a. The following definitions and properties are
from [MS06].
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The weakest (liberal) precondition can be defined as
wlp.(a, p).q =df [a]q , wp.(a, p).q =df p ∧wlp.(a, p).q .
This implies Nelson’s pairing condition for commands k:
wp.k.q = wp.k.1 ∧wlp.k.q .
An important auxiliary concept is the guard of a command:
grd.(a, p) =df ¬wp.(a, p).0 = ¬p ∨ pa = p→ pa .
It characterises the set of states that, if non-diverging, allow a transition under a.
A command is called total if its guard equals 1. The above formula links Parnas’s
condition [Par83] on termination constraints with totality:
grd.(a, p) = 1 ⇔ p ≤ pa .
Nelson remarks that totality of command k is also equivalent to Dijkstra’s law wp.k.0 =
0 of the excluded miracle.
The basic non-iterative commands are defined as
fail =df (0,>) , skip =df (1,>) , abort =df (0, 0) ,
(a, p) dc(b, q) =df (a + b, p ∧ q) , (a, p) ; (b, q) =df (a · b, p ∧[a]q) .
Here p ∧[a]q characterises those states for which a is guaranteed to terminate and
which under a only lead to guaranteed termination states of b.
The commands form a left semiring, i.e., satisfy all semiring laws except for the
right annihilation law for the zero element fail.
Theorem B.1. The structure COM(S) =df (COM(S), dc, fail, ;, skip) is an idempo-
tent left semiring. The associated natural order on COM(S) is
(a, p) ≤ (b, q) ⇔ a ≤ b ∧ p ≥ q .
The proof can be found in [MS06]. It is essential that semiring S be a semiring and
not only a left semiring.
As in [HH98] we say that command k is (H4) or feasible iff k ; abort = abort. One
calculates, using [a]0 = ¬pa and semiring properties,
(a, p) ; abort = (a · 0, p ∧[a]0) = (0, p ∧¬pa) .
Corollary B.2. Command (a, p) is feasible iff p ≤ pa.
So feasibility amounts exactly to Parnas’s condition [Par83].
Therefore abort and skip are feasible, whereas fail is not. Moreover, dc and ; pre-
serve feasibility.
The feasible commands will give rise to demonic semantics (total correctness
semantics) in Section B.4.
For the remainder of this chapter we will omit the operators ∧ and · to simplify
notation.
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B.3 Refinement
Let us now look more closely at the natural order induced on the commands by the
left semiring structure. By antitony of box we obtain for commands k, l
k ≤ l ⇒ wlp.k ≥ wlp.l ∧ wp.k ≥ wp.l ,
where on the right hand side ≥ is the pointwise order between condition transformers.
The second conjunct is the converse of the usual refinement relation. For it one obtains
(see [MS06])
(∀ r : wp.(a, p).r ≥ wp.(b, q).r) ⇔ p ≥ q ∧ b ≥ q a .
We use the latter formula as the refinement relation between commands:
(a, p) v (b, q) ⇔df q ≤ p ∧ q a ≤ b .
Due to our generalised setting we only have k v l ⇒ wp.k ≥ wp.l. Equivalence
holds if the underlying modal condition semiring S is extensional, i.e, if 〈a〉 ≤ 〈b〉 ⇒
a ≤ b (the converse implication holds by isotony).
Unlike ≤ the relation v is only a pre-order with associated equivalence relation
k ≡ l ⇔df k v l ∧ l v k .
Componentwise, it works out to (a, p) ≡ (b, q) ⇔ p = q ∧ p a ≤ b ∧ p b ≤ a, which
further simplifies to
(a, p) ≡ (b, q) ⇔ p = q ∧ p a = p b . (eqc)
This agrees with the behaviour of designs described in [HH98]. For instance,
(p a, p) ≡ (a, p) ≡ (p→ a, p) .
Our relations between commands are put into perspective by
Lemma B.3.
1. k ≤ l ⇒ k v l ⇒ wp.k ≥ wp.l.
2. k v l ⇔ k dc l ≡ l.
The proof can be found in [MS06]. This lemma explains our choice for the direc-
tion of the v relation; in many texts on refinement it is used the other way around.
For calculations to work smoothly the following property is important:
Lemma B.4.
1. The operations dc and ; on commands are v-isotone.
2. The equivalence ≡ is a congruence w.r.t. dc and ;.
The proof can be found in [MS06].
Finally we look at the lattice structure of commands under v. Note that join
and meet can also be defined for pre-orders; they enjoy all the usual properties except
that they are unique only up to the associated equivalence relation.
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Lemma B.5.
1. The join of commands (a, p) and (b, q) w.r.t. v is
(a, p) unionsq (b, q) = (a + b, p q) = (a, p) dc(b, q) .
2. If the meet a u b exists then so does the meet of (a, p) and (b, q) w.r.t. v, viz.
(assuming that u binds more strongly than +)
(a, p) u (b, q) = (a u b + ¬p b + ¬q a, p + q) .
3. If S has a greatest element > then chaos =df (>, 0) is the v-greatest element of
COM(S). Moreover, chaos is feasible.
In the remainder we will work with the quotient set C(S) =df COM(S)/≡ most
of the time, but still abbreviate the classes [(a, p)]≡ by their representatives (a, p).
We now prove two new results that are essential for our use of commands in a
product family algebra.
Lemma B.6. The equivalence ≡ is a congruence w.r.t. unionsq,u, p −→ and if fi.
Proof. We spell out the proofs for unionsq and u; the remaining ones are similar.
Suppose (a, p) ≡ (c, r), i.e., p = r and p a = p c. We only show the congruence
property for the first arguments of unionsq and u ; for the second arguments it follows by
commutativity of these operations.
For the join we have by definition
(a, p) unionsq (b, q) = (a + b, p q), (c, p) unionsq (b, q) = (c + b, p q).
Now
p q (a + b) = p q a + p q b = q p c + p q b = p q c + p q b = p q (c + b),
which shows (a, p) unionsq (b, q) ≡ (c, p) unionsq (b, q).
For the meet we have by definition
(a, p) u (b, q) = (a u b + ¬p b + ¬q a, p + q),
(c, p) u (b, q) = (a u b + ¬p b + ¬q a, p + q).
Now
(p + q) (a u b + ¬p b + ¬q a)
= {[ distributivity and test algebra ]}
p (a u b) + q (a u b) + ¬p q b + ¬q p a
= {[ splitting q in second summand ]}
p (a u b) + p q (a u b) + ¬p q (a u b) + ¬p q b + ¬q p a
= {[ second summand subsumed by first one, third one by fourth one ]}
p (a u b) + ¬p q b + ¬q p a
= {[ test and meet (2.1) ]}
p a u b + ¬p q b + ¬q p a
= {[ assumption p a = p c ]}
p c u b + ¬p q b + ¬q p c
= {[ reverse derivation ]}
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(p + q) (c u b + ¬p b + ¬q c),
which shows (a, p) u (b, q) ≡ (c, p) u (b, q). uunionsq
Lemma B.7. If the underlying semiring is a distributive lattice then join and meet
of commands distribute over each other in the following way.
1. ((a, p) unionsq (b, q)) u (c, r) = ((a, p) u (c, r)) unionsq (b, q) u (c, r)).
2. ((a, p) u (b, q)) unionsq (c, r) ≡ ((a, p) unionsq (c, r)) u (b, q) unionsq (c, r)).
Proof. 1. Plugging in the definitions we obtain
((a, p) unionsq (b, q)) u (c, r)
= ((a + b, p q) u (c, r)
= ((a + b) u c + ¬(p q) c + ¬r (a + b), p q + r)
and
((a, p) u (c, r)) unionsq (b, q) u (c, r))
= (a u c + ¬p c + ¬r a, p + r) unionsq (b u c + ¬q c + ¬r b, q + r)
= (a u c + ¬p c + ¬r a + b u c + ¬q c + ¬r b, (p + r) (q + r))
= {[ rearrangement and distributivity ]}
((a + b) u c + (¬p + ¬q) c + ¬r (a + b), p q + r))
and de Morgan shows the claim.
2. Plugging in the definitions we obtain
((a, p) u (b, q)) unionsq (c, r) = (a u b + ¬p b + ¬q a + c, (p + q) r)
and
((a, p) unionsq (c, r)) u (b, q) unionsq (c, r))
= (a + c, p r) u (b + c, q r)
= ((a + c) u (b + c) + ¬(q r) (a + c) + ¬(p r) (b + c), p r + q r)
= {[ distributivity and omitting summands ≤ c ]}
((a u b) + c + ¬(q r) a + ¬(p r) b, (p + q) r)
= {[ de Morgan, distributivity and collecting
all summands with a factor ¬r ]}
((a u b) + c + ¬q a + ¬p b + ¬r (a + b + 1), (p + q) r)
Now (eqc) and (p + q) r¬r (a + b + 1) = 0 show the claim.
uunionsq
B.4 Demonic Semantics
We have already seen that command (a, p) is feasible if and only if p ≤ pa and thus
define the set of feasible commands as F(S) = {(a, p)|(a, p) ∈ C(S) ∧ p ≤ pa}. The aim
of the present section is to establish a correspondence between feasible commands and
elements of the underlying semiring S. It will be used to define the demonic operators
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on S and is given by two mappings [GM06]
E : F(S) −→ S , D : S −→ F(S) ,
E((a, p)) =df p a , D(a) =df (a, pa) .
We will abbreviate E((a, p)) to E(a, p). This function, which would make sense even
for arbitrary pairs, describes the demonic view of (a, p) that discards all input states
of a for which both termination and nontermination may occur, i.e., all those charac-
terised by ¬p pa. For the resulting semiring element, no extra termination information
is needed; this is reflected in the definition of D. Moreover, from the definition and
(eqc) it is clear that E respects the eqivalence ≡, i.e., (a, p) ≡ (b, q) ⇒ E(a, p) =
E(b, q).
Lemma B.8. E and D are inverse to each other, i.e., D(E(a, p)) ≡ (a, p) and
E(D(a)) = a.
The proof can be found in [MS06].
We will now give a demonic ordering and demonic operations on S for modelling
total correctness. In contrast to [DMT04], where such an ordering and operations are
introduced by new definitions, we can derive these using the correspondence from
Lemma B.8. The demonic refinement ordering is
a v b ⇔df D(a) v D(b) ⇔ (a, pa) v (b, pb) ⇔ pb ≤ pa ∧ pb a ≤ b.
By (eqc) and (cd1) v is antisymmetric, i.e., a partial order. Thus, by Lemma B.8,
the mappings E and D are order isomorphisms between (F(S),v) and (S,v). Since
chaos is the greatest element of COM(S), and therefore also of F(S), the v-greatest
element of S is E(chaos) = E(>, 0) = 0. In general, however, there is no v-smallest
element, since the corresponding least element fail of COM(S) is not feasible.
The demonic composition is
a 2 b =df E(D(a) ; D(b)) = E((a, pa) ; (b, pb)) = E(a b, pa [a]pb)
= (pa [a]pb) a b = ([a]pb) a b .
The unit skip of COM(S) is feasible, thus E(skip) = E(1, 1) = 1 is also the unit of
demonic composition.
The demonic join (which is the v-join and coincides with demonic choice) is
a unionsq b =df E(D(a) unionsqD(b)) = pa pb (a + b) .
The demonic meet, whenever it exists, is
a u b =df E(D(a) uD(b)) = a u b + ¬pa b + ¬pb a ;
the necessary and sufficient condition for its existence is the feasibility of D(a)uD(b),
which is equivalent to p(a u b) = pa pb (see again [MS06]).
Now we can establish properties analogous to the ones for unionsq and u.
Lemma B.9. The operations unionsq and u are associative and commutative and distribute
over each other.
Proof. As a sample we deal with distributivity, assuming that all demonic meets
involved exist:
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(a u b) unionsq c
= {[ definitions ]}
E(D(E(D(a) uD(b))) unionsqD(c))
= {[ D(E(k)) ≡ k and E respects ≡ ]}
E((D(a) uD(b)) unionsqD(c))
= {[ by Lemmas B.7 and B.6 and since E respects ≡ ]}
E((D(a) unionsqD(c)) u (D(b) unionsqD(c)))
= {[ k ≡ D(E(k)) and E respects ≡ ]}
E(D(E(D(a) unionsqD(c))) uD(E(D(b) unionsqD(c))))
= {[ definitions ]}
(a unionsq c) u (b unionsq c).
uunionsq
